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COMMENTS
Greenmail: From Backrooms to Boardrooms to
Courtrooms
INTRODtCTION
Defensive tactics employed by target corporations in recent cor-
porate takeover battles have generated mounting concern in both
boardrooms and courtrooms.1 To fend off a takeover,2 target com-
panies have employed devices such as a "white knight," 3 "poison
pill,"'  "pac man' 5 and, the subject of this Comment, "green-
1. In 1960, there were eight tender offers to acquire control of corporations with
securitites listed on national exchanges. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2811, 2812. In 1982, there
were 94 tender offers. As the number of tender offers has increased, the defensive tactics
have also. Defensive tactics are actions by a board of directors taken at the expense of the
corporation in order to ward off a takeover. See Greene & Junewicz, A Reappraisal of
Current Regulation of Mergers and Acquisistions, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 647, 650 n.3 (1984).
2. The person or company seeking to gain ownership control of another company is
called a raider. A raider can achieve a takeover by a proxy fight or by a tender offer.
Although tender offers are more popular, there is an apparent resurgence in the use of
proxy fights to gain control. There are two types of tender offers, a cash tender offer and a
public exchange offer. A cash tender offer is an invitation to the shareholders of a company
to tender their shares to the raider in exchange for cash. The raider states in its tender
offer how many shares it seeks to purchase. The amount stated will be enough to at least
give the raider working control of the target company. The proportional size of the desired
holding depends on the characterisitics of the target company. If shareholders tender for
sale fewer shares than the amount stated by the raider in its tender offer, then the raider is
not required to buy any shares. If more than the stated amount of shares is tendered, then
the raider has the option to purchase the excess.
A public exchange offer is essentially the same as a tender offer except that instead of
offering cash in exchange for the shares, the raider offers a package comprised of debt
and/or equity. Effectively, the raider gives the tendering shareholders an interest in it in
exchange for their interest in the target company. The well developed, sophisticated securi-
ties exchange market provides an easy way for the tendering shareholders in a public ex-
change offer to sell their interests in the raider. As a result, the distinction between a cash
tender offer and a public exchange offer is blurred. R. HAMILTON, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS 602-03 (2d ed.
1981).
3. A "white knight" is a friendly third party investor. When a target company is
faced with a takeover threat, a defensive measure may be to attract a white knight to buy a
sufficient number of shares in the target corporation, thereby precluding the raider making
the hostile takeover from ever obtaining control of the target company. See Mobil Corp. v.
Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 336 (6th Cir. 1981); and Block & Miller, The Responsibilites
and Obligations of Corporate Directors in Takeover Contests, 11 SEC. REG. L.J. 44, 52-53
(1983).
4. A "poison pill" can take many forms, but in every case it acts as a negative attri-
bute of the target corporation which a raider would have to "swallow" should it complete
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mail. ''6 The impact of these defensive devices on corporations,
combined with the failure of natural market control, has prompted
the business community to turn to the law for a remedy. However,
the nature and complexity of the problem has made the formula-
tion of a legal solution very difficult.
Greenmail is the practice of using the threat of a takeover to
force a target corporation 7 to pay to remove the threat. Stated
simply, greenmail is the premium' above market price9 that a tar-
get corporation pays to repurchase its own shares from the raider
in order to fend off a takeover.1" Although greenmail is not a com-
pletely new idea, greenmail payments have grown larger and more
frequent1" and the business world and the law have become more
the takeover. A common type of poison pill is found in the company charter of the target
corporation providing that its shareholders can exchange their shares for those of the raider
at a rate costly to the raider. Such a provision is usually triggered by a raider obtaining a
certain percentage of control, such as 30% or 40%. The intention of including such a provi-
sion in the company charter is to make a takeover so costly to a raider that it is unable to
consumate it. See, e.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984);
Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059 (Del. Ch. 1985), affid 500 A.2d 1346
(1985).
5. "Pac man" is a scheme whereby a target company defends against the takeover
by trying to take over the raider. Thus, each urgently purchases the other's shares. The
party which first acquires control of the other is the winner. See Martin Marietta Corp. v.
Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1982); Block & Miller, supra note 3, at 64-66.
6. Greenmail is a payment made by a target corporation to repurchase its own
shares from a raider threatening a takeover. For example, Raider wants to greenmail Tar-
get. First, Raider purchases at least five percent of the outstanding shares of Target. At
that point, the law requires that Raider notify Target of its purchase by filing a statement
with the SEC. This statement must contain, inter alia, any intentions of Raider to acquire
control of Target. In order for Raider to greenmail Target, Raider announces its intent to
take over Target. Soon thereafter, Raider makes a tender offer to the other shareholders of
Target to effectuate that intention. Once the tender offer is made, Target becomes defen-
sive and tries to stop the takeover. Raider, anticipating this reaction, then offers to sell its
Target shares back to Target, eliminating the threat of Raider's takeover. Target will be so
enthusiastic to remove that threat that it pays a premium for the shares Raider holds. This
payment is the greenmail payment.
7. A "target corporation" is a company subject to a tender offer. More specifically,
a target corporation is the company whose shares an investor is offering to purchase from
its shareholders. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1306 (5th ed. 1979).
8. "Premium" is the value above the listed market price that one is offering. For
example, if a stock is listed at $10 per share on the securities exchange and an investor
offers $15 per share, then $5 is the premium. Comment, Golden Parachutes: A Perk That
Boards Should Scrutinize Carefully, 67 MARQ. L. REV. 293 n.4 (1984).
9. "Market price" is the value of the share that is listed on the securities stock
exchange. Market value is much more difficult to ascertain if the company's stock is not
listed on a securities exchange. Various valuation methods exist to approximate the value
of shares not traded on a securities exchange. The details of such methods are beyond the
scope of this Comment. See Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay
for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L. 223, 231-35 (1962).
10. See supra note 6.
1I. Between November, 1983, and December, 1984, at least eight greenmail at-
tempts were successfully consumated resulting in about $750 million in profits. Block &
Miller, supra note 3; Note, Greenmail: Targeted Stock Repurchases and the Management-
Entrenchment Hypothesis, 98 HARv. L. REV. 1045 (1985).
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concerned about controlling it. In 1984, attempts at greenmail re-
sulted in over $600 million in profits 12 -and the practice contin-
ues. Since both natural market forces and legislation 3 have been
unsuccessful in controlling greenmail, the corporate world has
turned to the courts for a solution.
There are three primary reasons why greenmail has become a
particular source of concern to both the business world and the
legal world. First, greenmail has had a negative impact on corpo-
rations and shareholders.14 Commentators have noted that
"[e]mpirical evidence shows that the stock market considers such
greenmail payments detrimental to shareholders." 5 Second, the
attempts at controlling greenmail through legislation is evidence
that there is congressional concern reflecting the public's
interests.1 6
Finally, the 1934 Securities Exchange Act17 includes in its
statement of purpose that it is an act to provide for the regulation
of security exchanges and over-the-counter markets operating in
interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails to prevent
inequitable and unfair practices.18 Greenmail payments made to
one shareholder at the expense of all other shareholders, without a
clear showing that they are in the best interests of the company as
a whole, conceivably come under the realm of this purpose. Spe-
cifically, the inequitable distribution of company funds among the
shareholders is a practice which appears to be covered by the Se-
12. Note, supra note 11, at 1045 n. I (citing Office of the Chief Economist, Securities
and Exchange Commission, The Impact of Targeted Share Repurchases (Greenmail) on
Stock Prices 15 (Sept. 11, 1984)).
13. Four bills were introduced into Congress in 1984 proposing to restrict greenmail
payments. Regarding the greenmail issue, all four bills were essentially the same. They
proposed to eliminate greenmail by prohibiting a company from purchasing its securities at
a premium from any person or persons who hold more than five percent of the company's
stock and who have held such stock for less than two years unless the company has share-
holder approval. S. 2782, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); S. 2777, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1984); S. 2754, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); H.R. 5693, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). See
also S. 286, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
14. A takeover entails purchasing a controlling interest in the target corporation at a
premium. This is an expensive endeavor, especially in the case of cash tender offers. If the
raider does not possess such resources, any greenmail attempt will fail because the underly-
ing threat of takeover necessary to succeed will be absent.
15. Note, supra note I1, at 1065.
16. The public's concern stems from the "unfairness" of the greenmail payment. One
shareholder receives a premium for his shares at the expense of the other shareholders in a
greenmail situation. See Macey & McChesney, A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate
Greenmail, 95 YALE L.J. 13, 48 (1985). See also Brudney, Equal Treatment of Sharehold-
ers in Corporate Distributions and Reorganizations, 71 CALIF. L. Rav. 1072 (1983). The
negative impact on shareholders also contributes to this concern. See generally infra notes
48-74 and accompanying text.
17. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
18. See McIntyre, Shareholders' Recourse Under Federal Securities Law Against
Management for Opposing Advantageous Tender Offers, 34 Bus. LAw. 1283 (1979).
1987]
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curities Exchange Act.
This Comment will address how effectively the courts have
dealt and could deal with greenmail. Part I of this Comment will
discuss the important role the business judgment rule plays in per-
mitting greenmail.1 9 Part II will address the effect of greenmail on
corporate capital structure.20 Part III will then discuss how the
law has dealt with the greenmail problem up to the present by
addressing first the legislative actions 21 and then judicial holdings
in this area,22 analyzing these attempts and determining whether
they present a viable solution. Finally, Part IV will propose creat-
ing a tribunal to solve not only the problems created by greenmail,
but also the problems created by other defensive tactics.23
I. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
The business judgment rule is a judicial tool to protect the
members of a board of directors from personal liability which
might arise from their business decisions. The rule effectively cre-
ates a presumption that the directors satisfied the fiduciary duty
they owed their shareholders. As a result, the decision of the di-
rectors of the target corporation to pay greenmail will not subject
them to liability despite the cost to the shareholders. 24 Given the
nature and complexity of business decisions, courts have found
that the best interests of that corporation are best served by not
trying to second-guess the directors.25 Courts have stated that im-
19. See infra notes 24-47 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 48-74 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 79-105 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 106-42 and accompanying text.
23. See Infra notes 43-78 and accompanying text.
24. United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263-64
(1917); Abramowitz v. Posner, 672 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1982); Shivers v. Amerco, 670 F.2d
826 (9th Cir. 1982); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981)
(Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981);
Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623 (D. Md. 1982); Whittaker Corp.
v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroluem Co., 493
A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619 (Del. 1984); Morgan v. Household
Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059 (Del. Ch. 1985); Kaufman v. Belmont, 479 A.2d 282 (Del. Ch.
1984). See also Johnson, Anti-Takeover Actions and Defenses: Business Judgment or
Breach of Duty?, 28 VILL. L. REv. 51, 52-53 (1982).
25. If directors were held personally liable for incorrect
business decisions, then not only would it be very difficult to find someone to be a director,
but those who would take the position would be very constrained in their actions. Business
decisions involve a great deal of uncertainty and require risk-taking. If liability were im-
posed, the directors would become risk averse and therefore could be inhibited from acting
in the best interests of the shareholders. Finding the proper balance between giving the
board members enough autonomy to make appropriate decisions and not giving them abso-
lute immunity so that they may act in their own self interests is difficult. See generally
Block & Miller, supra note 3, at 46-52; Johnson, supra note 24, at 55-56; Walsh, Defen-
sive Tactics and the Fiduciary Obligations of the Target Board of Directors, 7 J. CORP. L.
[Vol. 23
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posing liabilty in these circumstances would inhibit the directors
to such a degree that they could not make appropriate decisions.26
The majority of courts will review the decisions of directors only
where there is a showing that the directors either acted in bad
faith or acted soley in their self-interests.2 7 This latter position is
very difficult to prove. Therefore, "the business judgment rule
does not express the measure by which a court determines
whether management has discharged its duty of care; rather, its
application reflects a conclusion that the management action in
question will not be reviewed at all."2
A minority of courts are not willing to afford a board of direc-
tors such blanket protection in the context of a hostile takeover.29
However, the minority view is divided on what form a more leni-
ent application of the business judgment rule should take.30 One
minority approach shifts the burden of proof to the defendant
board requiring it to show that its actions were made in good faith
and were in the best interests of the corporation." This stems
from the general practice of the courts to shift the burden of proof
from the plaintiff to the defendant where there is evidence of
fraud, self-dealing, overreaching or abuse of discretion.32 Propo-
nents of this minority view assert that because of the natural con-
flict of interest between the directors and the corporation when a
takover threat occurs, any actions by the directors perpetuating
their control resembles self-dealing. 33 However, shifting the bur-
den of proof has not significantly altered the effect of the business
judgment rule because the burden is easily satisfied. For example,
579, 581 (1982).
26. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
27. In the case of a parent/subsidiary relationship, the potential for self-dealing is so
great that the courts will put the burden on the directors to show that their decision was
made in good faith. See Brudney, supra note 16, at 115-18, for a discussion concerning the
increased potential for self-dealing in the parent/subsidiary merger context.
28. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive
Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 822 (1981).
29. Committee on Corporate Laws, Guidelines for Directors: Planning for and Re-
sponding to Unsolicited Tender Offers, 41 Bus. LAw. 209, 211 (1985) [hereinafter Guide-
lines for Directors]. See also Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964), and
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
30. See Guidelines for Directors, supra note 29, at 211, and Cheff, 41 Del. Ch. at
506, 199 A.2d at 555.
31. See Guidelines for Directors, supra note 29, at 211.
32. In most cases, showing fraud, self-dealing, overreaching or abuse of discretion is
very difficult. Id. For a discussion on the difficulty of proving fraud under section 14(e) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, see McIntyre, supra note 18.
33. "If courts view greenmail payments as simply vehicles for entrenching incumbent
management, and if incumbent management cannot articulate coherent alternative justifi-
cations, such payments may be prohibited." Macey & McChesney, supra note 16, at 54;
Walsh, supra note 25; Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management
in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981); McIntyre, supra note 18.
19871
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in Cheff v. Mathes,s4 the defendant directors satisfied the court by
simply asserting that they had a better strategy planned for the
corporation than did the raider.3 5 The other minority approach
takes the inquiry one step further by actually reviewing the
board's decisions or by requiring the board to show that its deci-
sions were not soley intended to retain control of the corporation."
The minority views of the business judgment rule stand in oppo-
sition to federal appellate courts which generally side with the
majority.3 7 Consequently, under both federal and state law, direc-
tors are afforded a wide latitude of discretion. This discretion re-
sults in director entrenchment 8 because directors who actively
manage the company secure themselves in their positions to the
extent that they become almost impossible to remove.
In this sense, management entrenchment is a negative by-prod-
uct of the business judgment rule. Apparently, up until this time,
management entrenchment is considered preferable to the alterna-
tive of not having the business judgment rule.39 This point is em-
phasized by the fact that even where a director is primarilly moti-
vated by self-interests, a majority of courts will not hold the
director liable for business decisions.4 Consequently, management
entrenchment has become a common problem in corporate law
today.
The most apparent problem with management entrenchment is
that the directors can more readily act in their own self-interests
and not in the best interests of the shareholders.41 Therefore,
34. 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964).
35. Id. at 506, 199 A. 2d at 555.
36. In Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985), the court looked be-
yond the business judgment rule, claiming that the board's decision was not made "upon
reasonable investigation." This case is, however, highly critized. See Guidelines for Direc-
tors, supra note 29.
37. See, e.g., Abramowitz v. Posner, 672 F.2d 1025 (2d. Cir. 1982); Shivers v.
Amerco, 670 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1982); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th
Cir. 1981) (Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1092 (1981); Miller v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974); Martin
Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623 (D. Md. 1982); Whittaker Corp. v.
Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. I1. 1982); Note, supra note 11, at 1057.
38. See Johnson, supra note 24, at 53; Walsh supra note 25, at 580; Note, supra
note 11, at 1048-49. The business judgment rule is an "almost irrebutable presumption of
sound business judgment, prevailing over everything but the elusive hobgoblins of fraud,
bad faith or abuse of discretion." Panter, 646 F.2d at 299 (Cudahy, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
39. This conclusion is simply an inference from the fact that the courts have adhered
so vehemently to the business judgment rule. See supra note 25 regarding the consequences
of not affording directors the protection of the business judgment rule.
40. See supra notes 25-36 and accompanying text; see also Lipton, supra note note
70, at 101. Lipton notes that despite all the lawsuits against directors, no director has been
found liable for rejecting a takeover.
41. Competition would theoretically converge the interests of the shareholders with
[Vol. 23
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when a takeover threat is posed, corporate management has the
freedom it needs to make the greenmail payment to the green-
mailer without concern for potential repercussions from its share-
holders, its creditors or the law. 2 Whether the takeover would
have been in the best interests of the shareholders will never be
addressed by the courts: The business judgment rule protects the
directors from this inquiry.43
The business community has made only one significant attempt
to try to prevent management entrenchment in the context of cor-
porate takeovers. A scheme called a "golden parachute" was de-
vised to eliminate directors' incentive to resist a takeover simply to
perpetuate their control."" However, this has not proven to be an
effective deterrent to management entrenchment. The size of the
payments to the directors in some cases are so enticing that the
directors incite a takeover. 45 Consequently, the business commu-
nity once again turns to the courts for assistance.
In addition to a successful golden parachute, directors will re-
tain a passive role in allowing a takeover to occur unresisted when
they are assured by the raider that their positions will not be
usurped.4" However, in the case of greenmail, the greenmailer
the interests of the managers. However, if the market could solve the problem, one must
question why the market has not done so already. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note
33, at 1164 for a discussion on how management's interests diverge from shareholders. See
also Macey & McChesney, supra note 16, at 15; Bebchuck, The Case for Facilitating
Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1028, 1030-33 (1982); McIntyre, supra note
18, at 1284.
42. "If the directors engage in resistance motivated by their own interest, and if they
are successful, there is no way ... to protect the shareholders' interest." Herzel, Schmidt
& Davis, Why Corporate Directors Have a Right to Resist Tender Offers, 61 CHI. B. REC.
152, 158 (1978).
43. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
44. The term "golden parachute" describes a device included in a company's by-laws
to provide for a monetary payment to be made to the directors in the event of a takeover if
the raider threatens to remove the board. This ensures that the directors will only defend a
takeover in the event that the takeover is truly not in the best interests of the company.
Although theoretically this device appears appealing, the size of the payments to directors
has given the appearance of self-dealing and, as a result, legislation has been proposed to
prohibit golden parachutes. See H.R. 5693, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). See also
Gruenbaum, Acquisitions and Mergers, 8 CORP. L. REV. 84 (1985); Comment, supra note
8.
45. This is the conflict of interest problem revisited, except that in this instance, the
directors' interest is not to perpetuate their control, but to be rid of it so they are paid the
"golden parachute." Therefore, if a takeover is instigated by the directors for this reason,
there is no indication that they will be acting in the best interests of the shareholders.
"Clearly, the 'golden parachute' agreement is prejudicial to corporate shareholders, in-
cludes self-dealing on the part of corporate directors and officers, and results in a 'raid' of
the corporate treasury." Johnson, supra note 24, at 70-71.
46. When an investor/raider acquires a five percent holding in another company, the
investor is required by § 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to file a Schedule
13D with the SEC. In the Schedule 13D, the investor must divulge any intention to take
over the target company, liquidate or merge it, or any other planned major change in the
7
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simply compounds the threat of takeover by stating that it intends
to change the management of the target company.41
As a result of the above characteristics of corporate direction,
the greenmailer can rely on the directors' response of perpetuating
their control on the board. The greenmailer, therefore, has the
foundation for success. Unfortunately, the greenmailer's success
negatively impacts target companies.
II. THE EFFECT OF GREENMAIL ON CORPORATE CAPITAL
STRUCTURE
Inevitably, greenmail has a detrimental effect on the capital
structure of a target company since the company is forced to incur
unnecessary debt in order to fight the alleged takeover. On one
hand, if the greenmail attempt is successful, then the company
must finance the greenmail payment. The popular way to finance
greenmail payments is to increase the company's debt.48 Increas-
ing debt can be accomplished by using any of the available corpo-
rate forms of debt.49 In 1984, greenmail cost corporations $3.5
billion,50 all of which was probably financed by the companies as-
suming additional debt.
Even if the greenmail attempt is unsuccessful, the company
must nonetheless finance the measures employed to ward off the
threat.5 1 This too is an expensive endeavor. In Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co.,52 Unocal was faced with a takeover threat
from Mesa Petroleum. Instead of making the greenmail payment
to Mesa, Unocal issued a self-tender offer, 53 intending to give the
board the majority voting rights. Consequently, the board could
prevent Mesa from either greenmailing or taking over Unocal.
business or corporate structure. This disclosure will also reveal the raider's intentions with
respect to changing management of the target corporation. 15 U.S.C. § 78 m(d) (1982).
47. By stating its intention to change management in the Schedule 13D, a raider can
ensure that the target's board of directors feels threatened.
48. Essentially, the only other way the target company could finance such a costly
procedure would be to have a stock issue. This is, however, more costly and cumbersome
than increasing debt and often entails an amendment to the charter. Even if a share issue
were permissable. its effect would be to dilute the value and earnings per share of outstand-
ing stock which would elicit a negative response from existing shareholders.
49. Many characteristics can be integrated into a bond or debenture to make it more
appealing. Those characteristics are
commonly termed "sweetners."
50. Note, supra note I1, at 1045.
51. A poison pill, self-tender offer and any other measure chosen to resist the take-
over inevitably costs large sums of money. See, e.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744
F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
52. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
53. A self-tender offer is an offer by an issuer to purchase its own shares at a stated
price from those willing to sell them. See id.
[Vol. 23
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The self-tender offer would have caused Unocal to incur at least
$6.1 billion of debt. Predictably, the court did not address the va-
lidity of the decision to incur such debt, relying on the business
judgment rule.
In another case, Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc.,54 Norlin
issued new stock to dilute the interest of a tender offer made by
Rooney, Pace. Norlin issued the stock to a wholly-owned subsidi-
ary and to a newly created employee stock option plan.5 This ef-
fectively increased the board's voting control and consequently en-
abled the board to ward off any attempted takeovers. These
actions by Norlin cost it approximately $6.8 million."6 Incurring
debt in such large sums, as evidenced by the above cases, would
certainly adversly affect the performance of the firm.57
In order to make a successful greenmail attempt, the green-
mailer must have the resources to pose a valid takeover threat.58
This usually entails millions, if not billions, of dollar in assets. Ar-
guably, one having such resources should be permitted to green-
mail since he should be able to profit from the use of such wealth
as he sees fit.59Other proponents of greenmail assert that green-
mail helps decrease the monitoring costs incurred in attempting to
reduce agency costs.8 0 Agency costs are the costs of management
performing in a way that does not fully maximize a corporation's
profit.6 The cost of poor management is lost profits, a cost which
is reflected in a share price that will be less than the company's
potential value. The corporation is thus considered undervalued."2
54. 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984).
55. The employee stock option plan (ESOP) was created by the board so that it
could dedicate the shares to the plan in return for a promissory note. Meanwhile, the board
maintained voting control of the ESOP stock so that its overall voting power would
increase.
56. Norlin Corp., 744 F.2d at 259.
57. Increasing debt increases the debt-to-captial ratio. A low ratio historically has
been an indication of financial stability. Comment, supra note 8, at 294 n.8.
58. See supra notes 2 & 14.
59. This extreme laissez-faire argument is untenable in that a logical extension of it
would justify ignoring all laws for the sake of pure capitalism.
60. This has been described as a "free-rider" problem because the investor seeking to
reduce agency costs bears a downside risk. That is, if the investor loses, he bears the costs
alone, and if he succeeds, the shareholders of the target company share in the benefits.
Easterbook & Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics, and Shareholders' Welfare, 36
Bus. LAW. 1733, 1739 (1981); Note, supra note II, at 1055-56.
61. The rationale underlying this concept is that if management worked at optimal
efficiency, the company would be making maximum profits. Therefore, if management is
operating at suboptimal efficiency, a percentage of the profits are forgone. See Bebohuck,
supra note 41, at 1030-31 & nn.18-19; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 33, at 1162-74.
62. The agency cost is reflected in the share price in that the market value of the
share will be less than the share price if managment were operating at optimal efficiency.
Prospective bidders monitor the performance of managerial teams by comparing a
corporation's potential value with its value (as reflected by share prices) under
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An investor will seek out an undervalued company, buy it, change
management and then realize the increase in share price that re-
flects the increased efficiency of the company.6"
Takeover investments of this nature are beneficial both to the
business and to the shareholders. Such takeover investments bene-
fit the shareholders by offering a premium for their shares; the
business is benefitted by the increase in management efficiency
that the takeover threat could prompt. In other words, the aware-
ness that the high agency cost of poor management will attract a
takeover gives management the incentive to increase its efficiency.
A natural result of increased management efficiency is increased
profits.
Such a positive market force will exist only so long as share-
holders profit. Raiders argue the benefits of greenmail in the fol-
lowing way: If the raider is successful, then all the shareholders
share the benefit; however, if the raider mistakenly invests in a
company that is not undervalued, then he alone bears the costs.
But if greenmail is permitted, then the raider can reduce his loss
(which comes from the greenmail payment being less than the
amount expended to purchase the shares) by the amount of the
greenmail payment and continue in pursuit of profiting from take-
overs which ultimately reduce agency costs. However, the cost of
the payment to the shareholders of the target company is greater
than the benefit that may accrue to the business world as a whole.
Thus, one author has asserted that "[ilt is impossible to assert
with any confidence that the benefits of increased policing of
agency costs outweigh the clear costs to shareholders of companies
that pay greenmail."" As a result, the negative impact that
greenmail has on shareholders has prompted efforts to control
greenmail despite contradicting arguments from certain investors.
Regardless of the success of the greenmail attempt, the final
outcome is that the target company incurs vasts amounts of debt.
current management. When the difference between the market price of a firm's
shares and the price those shares might have under different circumstances be-
comes too great, an outsider can profit by buying the firm and improving its
management.
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 33, at 1173. See also Johnson, supra note 24, at 52-53.
63. A raider will offer a premium price for the shares of a target corporation in order
to entice the shareholders to sell their shares to the raider. However, the premium must be
lower than the amount that the raider can realize after obtaining control of the target
corporation. "The source of the premium is the reduction in agency costs, which makes the
firm's assets worth more in the hands of the acquirer than they were worth in the hands of
the firm's managers." Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 33, at 1173. Premiums realized
by the target company's shareholders range from 14% to 50%. Id. at 1187. See also Den-
nis, Two-Tiered Tender Offers and Greenmail: Is New Legislation Needed?, 19 GA. L.
REv. 281, 317 n.175 (1985); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 60, at 1737-39.
64. Note, supra note II, at 1056.
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This creates two problems for the target corporation. First, the
resulting monetary constraints infringe on the shareholders' rights
because they will have involuntarily forgone a potential dividend
or an increase in share valuation.65
The second problem that greenmail creates is that it restricts
the company's daily business activites.6" Incurring more debt
could affect the firm's day-to-day business because funds must be
expended to service the debt. That is, the costs of issuing the debt
must be paid6 7 in addition to the interest payments as they come
due.68 This strain on cash flow will effectively restrict the firm's
working capital to the extent that the firm is limited in allocating
funds to the various factions of its business. 9 In addition, funds
otherwise available for new investments, such as for research and
development, are reduced in the same manner. The benefits which
accrue to society from research and development certainly justify
taking steps to eliminate any device which impedes the ability to
further promote such advances.
The negative impact of greenmail on a target corporation is re-
flected in its share price.7 0 When a takeover is first announced, the
share price of the target company will increase to reflect the pre-
mium over market price that the shareholders7 1 anticipate from
the new management of the raider. However, empirical studies
show that immediately following the announcement of the repur-
chase agreement (the greenmail payment), the share price drops
65. If the target company held excess cash, it could pay a dividend or could reinvest
the money and transfer the wealth indirectly to the shareholders.
66. Research and development is one type of activity in which a company might
engage. New products and innovations generated therefrom can result in enormous profits.
67. The cost of issuing the debt includes designing the debt, maintaining legal coun-
sel, printing the bonds and, of course, paying the underwriters' fee.
68. Interest payments must be made regulary, without fail, whereas shares only re-
quire dividend payments when earnings are sufficient. If interest payments are not made,
the company goes into default, incurring a number of problems including losing any
favorable bond rating it may have had. Even without defaulting, the increase in the debt-
to-capital ratio may cause a drop in the company's bond rating. An example of this re-
sulted from the Martin Marietta-Bendix battle. Martin Marietta increased its long term
debt from $400 million to $1.3 billion in order to fight the battle. This raised its debt-to-
capital ratio from 22% to 44%. As a result, Moodys Investors Service downgraded Mari-
etta's bond rating for senior unsecured from Al to Baa3. Comment, supra note 8, at 294
n.9.
69. Any potential projects that the company could have invested in will be post-
poned. Also, the capital required to keep the present productivity lines going could be
limited.
70. See Macey & McChesney, supra note 16, at 43; Note, supra note 11, at 1051-
53. Some argue that shareholders do not benefit from tender offers because takeovers "ad-
versely affect long-term planning and thereby jeopardize the economy .... " Lipton, Take-
over Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101, 105 (1979).
71. Block & Miller, supra note 3; Bebehuck, supra note 41; Easterbrook & Fischel,
supra note 33; McIntyre, supra note 18.
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an average of two to seven percent below the price just prior -to
the announcement of the takeover. 2 Additionally, "[u]nlike the
initial increase in price, the decrease is directly attributable to the
greenmail payment . ... ,,7 The decrease in share price which
follows a greenmail payment reflects the target company's expen-
diture of funds without any anticipated return on this "invest-
ment." As a result, the shareholders directly realize the negative
impact of greenmail by incurring a decrease in the value of their
shares.
As a result of the negative effect that greenmail has on corpora-
tions, greenmail has received a copious amount of attention and
concern emanating from the courts, Congress, the Securitites and
Exchange Commission, economists, business executives and the
press. The emphasis at this time is on the courts and on Congress.
While proponents of restricting greenmail are attempting to pro-
pose legislative remedies, the courts are forced under existing law
to allow most of the defensive tactics to continue.74
III. THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF GREENMAIL
Another consideration in evaluating the impact of greenmail is
that greenmail discriminates among shareholders by transfering
corporate wealth from many shareholders to one, or very few,
shareholders.7 5 This is an inequity which has been referred to as
the "unfairness doctrine. '7 8 Greenmail is not attacked on this ba-
sis because the assertion of the board of directors that it is remov-
ing a threat to the company will be presumed valid under the bus-
iness judgment rule.7 As a result, greenmail is legally permitted
and, in the words of Senator Riegle, "[u]nder current law there is
nothing whatsoever illegal about these practices where it is possi-
ble to make millions upon millions of easy dollars. 178 This section
of this Comment first addresses the legislative attempts at prohib-
iting greenmail and then considers the potential for legislative
remedy. Last is a discussion of the judicial treatment of
greenmail.
72. Note, supra note 11, at 1053.
73. Id. at 1054.
74. Id. The business judgment rule prevents judicial scrutiny of the defensive tactics
employed by directors of target corporations. See also supra note 25 and accompanying
text.
75. By paying a premium for only the greenmailer's shares, the target corporation
has excluded all the other shareholders from this benefit.
76. This unfairness doctrine requires that shareholders be treated equally. See supra
note 16.
77. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
78. Macey & McChesney, supra note 16, at 52.
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A. Legislation of Greenmail
In 1984, four legislative proposals were introduced in Congress
to combat the problem of greenmail79 as amendments to the 1934
Securities Exchange Act.80 They were virtually identical bills, but
none were passed."1
The key element of the proposals was to prohibit any issuer of
shares from buying back its shares at a price above the market
level from someone who has held them for less than two years,
unless the issuer has shareholder approval.82 This restriction, how-
ever, not only infringes on legitimate stock transactions, but also
ignores the practical effect of shareholder approval. In the vast
majority of cases, shareholders do not actively participate in cor-
porate votes. Past experience has shown that if they do not vote by
proxy, they do not vote at all. As a result, the board of directors of
a target corporation will not realistically be prevented from mak-
ing the greenmail payments; doing so merely would be more
cumbersome.8 3
Arguably, in the case of mergers, shareholder approval is irrele-
vant because shareholders act on an uninformed basis and, there-
fore, are not qualified to make judgments regarding greenmail."
Since mergers and takeovers entail many similar problems and
complexities, perhaps takeovers should also be left to the board of
directors. However, proponents of this idea also call for a stricter
judicial review of boards' decisions, that is, a restriction of the
application of the business judgment rule. Ultimately, requiring
shareholder approval of the boards' actions would not result in
prohibiting or even significantly impeding greenmail.
79. See supra note 13. Senator Donald Riegle reintroduced anti-greenmail legisla-
tion in the ninety-ninth Congress. S. 286, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
80. See Greene & Junewisz, A Reappraisal of Current Regulation of Mergers and
Acquisitions, supra note i, at 653. See also, H.R. REP. No. 5693, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1984).
81. S. 2851, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), a major banking reform bill which in-
cluded a rider prohibiting greenmail, was passed by the Senate, but did not make it
through the House. Senator Riegle reintroduced the same anti-greenmail legislation in the
99th Congress. See supra note 79; Dennis, supra note 63, at 333 n.248.
82. H.R. REP. No. 5693, supra note 80.
83. The directors of a target corporation might have to issue a variety of letters and
pamphlets explaining the choices facing the shareholders. The directors would try to per-
suade the shareholders not to offer any shares to the raider and convince them that the best
interests of the corporation would be served by voting affirmatively for the directors' propo-
sal. Also, the corporation might have to bear the cost of having the shareholders' meeting.
The costs of these procedures effectively fall on the shareholders. This probably would be
acceptable if the shareholders' vote would ensure scrutiny of the board by the shareholders.
However, the evidence suggests that such a shareholders' vote does not result in such scru-
tiny. Bebchuck, supra note 41, at 1030-31.
84. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 890 (Del. 1985).
85. Id. at 873, 890.
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Other less crucial elements in the proposals would also be insuf-
ficient to prevent greenmail. 88 One of the proposed amendments
would affect the time to file the Schedule 13D (a disclosure
form) 87 with the SEC. The present law requires that the state-
ment be filed within ten days after a five percent holding in a
corporation has been acquired.8" The proposal shortened the time
to file to forty-eight hours.89 The rationale behind allowing less
than ten days to file is that if the intentions of the potential green-
mailer can be disclosed sooner, then the target corporation has
more opportunity to fend off the greenmailer. 9° This proposed
amendment is directed at takeovers, as well as at greenmail, in
order to allow a target corporation more timely notice of a hostile
takeover. The implication of more timely notice with respect to
greenmail is that if the directors know of the takeover threat
sooner, then they will not have to resort to such drastic defensive
measures as making greenmail payments. 91 However, the Sched-
ule 13D is not required to be filed until a five percent holding is
acquired at which point a successful greenmail attempt could still
occur.2 In all likelihood, the proposal's only effect have would be
to reduce the target corporation's costs because the raider would
have a smaller holding to be repurchased. Consequently, this pro-
posal involves no specific regulation of greenmail and does not
pose a viable means of preventing this practice.
The question then arises whether any legislation could be an
effective means of controlling greenmail. Three elements appar-
ently must be satisfied for legislation to successfully prohibit
greenmail: First, the law must be able to identify greenmail situa-
tions; second, it must propose restrictions to prevent greenmailing;
and third, it must not infringe on legitmate stock transactions.
86. H.R. REP. No. 5693, supra note 80.
87. See supra note 46.
88. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1982).
89. See H.R. REP. No. 5693, supra note 80, at 22.
90. If the target corporation knows of the takeover sooner, then it can employ its
defensive tactics sooner. The effectiveness of the federal disclosure requirements is empha-
sized by Dan River, Inc. v. lcahn, 701 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1983). In this case, the Icahn
group filed a Schedule 13D and included its intention to either take over control or sell the
acquired shares back to the issuer. Id. at 280-81. The court held that this outright disclos-
ure of the intent to greenmail did not violate any federal laws. Id. at 285.
91. "Drastic defensive measures" include greenmail, poison pills, white knights and
such other tactics.
92. Knowing about the takeover threat sooner will not prevent the target corporation
from employing defensive tactics. It merely allows the target corporation to employ them
sooner which may decrease the target company's cost to defend. But, the directors' actions
will remain essentially the same.
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1. Legislative Identification of Greenmail
In effect, greenmail is a disguised takeover attempt. As a result,
drafting applicable legislation without infringing on legitimate
takeovers is difficult.93 A raider attempting to greenmail follows
identical procedural steps as though intending to make a legiti-
mate takeover. That is, the raider first acquires a five percent
holding in the target company and within ten days files a Sched-
ule 13D. Among other items, the statement reveals the raider's
intentions to take over the target company and to change manage-
ment once the takeover is completed. Following the filing of the
Schedule 13D, the target company's board of directors attempts
to devise a plan to resist the takeover, while the raider issues a
tender offer.9 Shortly after this, the raider distinguishes the
greenmail from a legitimate takeover. If the actions by the raider
are a legitimate takeover, the raider continues to solicit offers
from the shareholders of the target corporation.95 However, if the
raider is attempting to greenmail, then the raider offers the target
corporation an agreement whereby the target corporation repur-
chases the raider's shares at a premium.98
Once the raider's holding is sold, the raider is satisfied with
having made a profit and the directors of the target corporation
are satisfied with knowing that they have continued security in
their positions. Therefore, legislation must focus on the time that
the raider first offers a repurchase agreement to the target corpo-
ration. The existing proposals have done so by limiting an issuer's
ability to repurchase its stock. However, even though the propos-
als have effectively isolated a takeover from greenmail, they have
infringed on legitimate share repurchases.
2. Restrictions Preventing Greenmail
On its face, the proposals' restriction of an issuer's ability to
repurchase its own shares could be effective in preventing green-
mail. If an issuer could not repurchase its shares, then it would be
precluded from accepting a greenmailer's offer to sell back his
shares. As a result, although effectively restricting greenmail is a
necessary element to successful legislation prohibiting greenmail,
it is an easily satisfied element.9
93. See supra note 13 for evidence of the failure of recent legislative proposals.
94. See supra notes 2 & 46.
95. The raider will not literally "solicit," but will simply keep the tender offer open.
96. This repurchase agreement represents the greenmail payment.
97. The restrictions themselves would be sufficient to prevent greenmail; however, the
problem of overlapping with legitimate share repurchases arises once again.
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3. Scope of Legislation
Under the proposed legislation, an issuer would be severly re-
stricted in efforts to repurchase its stock.98 In many instances, a
corporation's stock is actively traded in the securities market and
investors commonly hold the shares for short periods of time. In
fact, depending on the nature of the stock, two years could be a
long time to hold onto a block of shares. If an investor were hold-
ing a "blue chip" stock,99 then the investor is likely to hold the
shares for a lengthy period of time. However, if the investor were
a speculator, then a holding period of less than two years is
likely.100 Therefore, companies which are more inclined to transfer
corporate wealth through an increased share price as opposed to
simply paying out a dividend will be more attractive to speculators
who are far outnumbered by their more conservative counterparts
who invest in blue chip stocks. Such corporations consequently
will have very few shareholders from whom shares can be
repurchased.
A difficult situation arises when there are only a few sharehold-
ers who have held their shares for more than two years. They may
either not want to sell their shares or, if they do, they will be in a
position to demand a premium.10' This latter case is a result of the
basic supply and demand function: Shareholders have a limited
supply of a commodity that the buyer wants, resulting in a higher
price for that commodity. This is effectively an inadvertent green-
mail payment created by legislation. In addition, a paradox arises
when there are no shareholders who have held their shares for
more than two years, thus preventing the issuer from repurchasing
its shares altogether. As a result, legislating the prohibition of
greenmail poses an undue restraint on stock purchases.
As proposed, the legislation could have an additional adverse
effect on the shareholders. Shareholders who want to sell shares
but are unable to find a buyer on the open market may be pre-
vented by the proposed legislation from making an offer to the
issuer if they have held their shares for less than two years. This
98. Conceivably this would interfere with free exchange of securities. See H.R. REP.
No. 5693, supra note 80, at 27-28.
99. Blue chip stock is stock that pays a fairly regular dividend. Its low-risk/low-
return characteristics are similar to those of an average interest bearing term deposit. In-
vestors consequently tend to treat blue chip stock as term deposits and leave their invest-
ment in the stock for a lengthy period of time.
100. A speculator purchases stock expecting that it will increase in price soon. Spec-
ulation is riskier than investing in blue chip stock but, when successful, it yields a higher
rate of return.
101. If there is only one or very few shareholders willing to sell their stock back to
the corporation, then those shareholders will be in a position to ask for more than the
market price, assuming that the company is willing to buy their stock.
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problem would be compounded if the market share price does not
accurately reflect the value of the firm.10 2 If there are high agency
costs10 3 or another reason why the share price is lower than the
actual value of the firm, then conceivably shareholders will be pre-
vented from realizing this value in a sale of the shares to the is-
suer.10 4 However, the hardship borne by the many shareholders in
allowing greenmail would outweigh the hardship borne by a few
in such an isolated instance. 0 5 Therefore, this unique problem
would not create a barrier to legislation if greenmail could effec-
tively be legislatively prohibited.
Any legislative attempt must ultimately consider the restraint
on security transactions that it would impose. Controlling green-
mail legislatively without infringing on legtimate stock exchanges
is extremely difficult. The present, unsuccessful attempts are per-
haps illustrative of the difficulty in prohibting greenmail through
legislation. The proposed bills not only appeared to infringe on
legitimate share repurchases, but also ignored the lack of control
shareholders practically exercise over boards of directors. As a re-
sult, legislation apparently is not an effective way to control
greenmail.
B. Judicial Response to Greenmail
A recent case involving a potential greenmail attempt is Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.l06 In this case, Mesa Petroleum Co.
attempted to greenmail Unocal Corporation. Mesa owned about
thirteen percent of Unocal's outstanding stock.107 On April 8,
1985, Mesa made a tender offer for sixty-four million shares, or
about thirty-seven percent of Unocal's outstanding stock.108 Uno-
cal's directors attempted to resist the takeover, claiming that it
102. A company's "true" value will not necessarily be relected in the share price.
This could occur for a number of reasons, such as those illustrated in Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). See Manning, supra note 9.
103. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
104. However, it is uncertain whether the issuing corporation will be willing to pay
the higher price for the shares.
105. In greenmail, the majority of shareholders suffer a detriment, whereas in this
scenerio, only those shareholders who have held shares for less than two years and cannot
find a buyer on the open market would suffer.
106. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). This was an issue of first impression in the Supreme
Court of Delaware.
107. Thirteen percent of the outstanding stock was approximately equivalent to
22,500,000 shares in Unocal. Id. at 949.
108. The tender offer was two-tiered. The first tier offered $54 for the first 64 million
shares. The second tier was an exchange of securities purportedly worth $54, but which
were really "junk bonds." They were called junk bonds because they would be highly sub-
ordinated to other debbt securities and would significantly change Unocal's capitalization.
Id. at 949-50 & 956.
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was not in the best interests of the company. 109 They were also not
willing to make the greenmail payment in order to remove the
threat of the takeover.110 As a consequence, Unocal's directors
tried a new approach: Unocal made an offer to all its shareholders
except Mesa to buy their shares at a higher price than what Mesa
was offering."11 The rationale behind making this offer was that if
the company held the shares, then Mesa could not have obtained
control of the company. 112 By removing the threat of takeover,
Unocal also removed the threat of greenmail."'
Mesa sued Unocal on the basis that Unocal discriminated
among its shareholders by making an offer to everyone but Mesa.
This was indeed a strong case against Unocal as the offer
amounted to shareholder discrimination. 14 In fact, when Unocal
requested a preliminary injunction to prevent Mesa from voting
its shares at the Unocal shareholders' meeting, the injunction was
denied.11 5 On the other hand, when Mesa requested a preliminary
injunction to prevent Unocal's offer, the injunction was granted.'"
To secure an injunction, the requesting party must show that
there is a likelihood that it will win on the merits of the case when
it finally goes to trial.1 71 Therefore, the judges sitting in equity
must have been convinced that Unocal's offer was a case of invalid
shareholder discrimination.
The Supreme Court of Delaware recognized that Unocal's offer
selectively treated some of its shareholders."" However, the court
also recognized that invalidating Unocal's offer would not only
permit greenmail, but would actually give greenmail the court's
seal of approval. As a result, the court held that under these cir-
cumstances, shareholder discrimination is acceptable." 9 In ad-
109. The typical response of any board of directors to a takeover threat is to resist it.
McIntyre, supra note 18, at 1283.
110. At that point, because Mesa had not offered a repurchase agreement, Unocal's
directors could not have known if Mesa intended a takeover or greenmail.
11. Unocal made its offer for $72 per share to entice its shareholders to tender to it
instead of accepting Mesa's offer of $54 per share. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 951.
112. Repurchasing shares, however, also results in a drastic change in capitalization.
Unocal would have had substantially more debt than equity which could have caused the
problems in the corporation's capital structure explained supra notes 48-74 and accompa-
nying text.
113. The threat of takeover is fundamental to the threat of grenmail. See supra note
14.
114. See supra note 16 for the reverse of the Unocal situation.
115. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 616 F. Supp. 149 (W.D. La. 1985).
116. Mesa Partners II v. Unocal Corp., 607 F. Supp. 624 (W.D. Okla. 1985).
117. Id; see also Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 616 F. Supp. 149 (W.D. La
1985).
118. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 957.
119. "As we have noted, [the board of directors'] duty of care extends to protecting
the corporation and its owners from perceived harm whether a threat originates from third
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dressing that issue, the court questioned: "Did the Unocal board
have the power and duty to oppose a takeover threat it reasonably
perceived to be harmful to the corporate enterprise, and if so, is its
action here entitled to the protection of the business judgment
rule?"120
Having established that the board had the power to oppose the
takeover, the court turned to the standards by which the board's
actions were to be evaluated. The court considered the business
judgment rule, but also recognized that there is an "omnipresent
specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own interest,
rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders." 121 As a
result, the court had "an enhanced duty which calls for judicial
examination at the threshold before the protections of the business
judgment rule may be conferred. 1 22 Due to the conflict of interest
that the court found, the board had the burden of showing that its
decision was made in good faith and on reasonable investiga-
tion.1 23 The court determined that the board satisfied this test by
showing that the majority of the board was comprised of outside
independent directors who appeared to have acted in good faith
and on reasonable investigation. 24
To be afforded the protection of the business judgment rule, the
Unocal board also had to show that its defensive tactic was rea-
sonable in relation to the threat posed.1 25 The court found that
Unocal resisted the takeover because of the "inadequacy" of
Mesa's tender offer and the reputation of Mesa's president as a
greenmailer 1 28 The court determined that the tender offer was in-
adequate because the offer was two-tiered, 127 thereby coercing the
shareholders to tender their shares. The "coercive" aspect
stemmed from the shareholders' fear of being compelled to settle
for the lower valued compensation in the second tier.1 28 Unocal
argued that its offer was to stop this takeover or, in the alterna-
tive, at least to provide those shareholders who would have had to
settle for the second tier with more adequate compensation for
parties or other shareholders." Id. at 955 (emphasis added).
120. Id. at 953. Delaware statutory and case law encompass well established princi-
ples giving the board of directors the power to manage the business affairs of the corpora-
tion. This includes protecting shareholders from a perceived harm, regardless of its source.
121. Id. at 954.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 954-55.
124. Id at 955.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 956.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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their shares. 12 9 In light of the reputation of Mesa's president as a
greenmailer, the court held that Unocal's defensive tactic was rea-
sonable given the threat posed. 30
Mesa argued that Unocal acted unlawfully by discriminating
among its shareholders. But in reality, Mesa forced Unocal into a
position where it had to discriminate. The question simply was
against whom was Unocal allowed to discriminate. Unocal either
could have discriminated against Mesa, as it did, or it could have
discriminated against all the other shareholders by paying Mesa
the greenmail. In the latter case, Unocal would have discrimi-
nated against the other shareholders because one shareholder,
Mesa, would have received a favored treatment by receiving more
value for its shares than would have been available to the other
shareholders.131 Therefore, in the case of greenmail, the share-
holder discrimination argument fails. Even though the court effec-
tively allowed shareholder discrimination, the Unocal decision has
not opened the doors to such discrimination. The courts have
shown proper restraint in controlling discriminatory offers.
Unilever Acquisition Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc.13 2 is an
example of the restraint courts have imposed on those arguing
that the Unocal case permits discriminatory actions. In this case,
Richardon-Vicks issued shares in a manner that would have
changed the Richardson group's holding from about thirty-three
percent to an absolute majority. This would have permitted Rich-
ardson-Vicks to prevent the takeover threatened by Unilever. 3
Richardson-Vicks asserted that although the change in voting
rights favored some shareholders over others, this was permissible
under Unocal.1 34 The Unocal court, however, specifically limited
shareholder discrimination to instances where the court considers
it to be an adequate measure to combat a takeover threat.13 5 In
Unilever, the court did not find that shareholder discrimination
was appropriate because the magnitude of reducing the transfera-
bility of a shareholder's ability to vote at least requires share-
129. ld..
130. Id.
131. Greenmail inevitably involves shareholder discrimination. As a result, it is hypo-
critical for a greenmailer to argue its case on the basis of being discriminated against.
132. 618 F. Supp. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
133. Once the board held majority voting rights, it would have refused to tender
shares to the raider, thereby terminating the takeover.
134. The board's rationale was that discriminatin among stockholders was permissi-
ble "when authorized by the stockholders or under extreme circumstances .... Unilever,
618 F. Supp. at 409.
135. "However, these cases are not applicable where the discrimination strips the
shareholder of the ability to transfer voting rights without prior warning, compensation or
shareholder authorization .... " Id. at 410.
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holder approval.1"6
Effectively, Unocal announces that the Delaware courts recog-
nize the problem of greenmail and will permit actions by the
board of a target corporation which frustrate greenmailers' at-
tempts. However, there are three potential criticisms of Unocal:
First, controlling greenmail is really a legislative function; second,
the holding is too narrow; and finally, the decision further per-
petuates management entrenchment. The previous discussion of
legislative attempts addressed the first criticism and concluded
that due to the potential infringement on legitimate security trans-
actions, legislation is not an effective method of prohibiting
greenmail.
The second criticism, which asserts that the holding in Unocal
is too narrow, addresses the fact that it was based on the green-
mail reputation of Mesa's president and the inadequacy of the
tender offer. That is, if the president of the greenmailing company
does not have a greenmailing reputation, and the tender offer is
"adequate," then the greenmail can proceed. This, however, ig-
nores the context in which the court examined these factors.137
The court looked at these elements as an indication of whether the
defensive tactic by the board was reasonable in relation to the
threat posed. The court looked to other items as well such as the
"nature and timing of the offer, questions of illegality, the impact
on 'constituencies' other than shareholders . . . , the risk of the
nonconsummation, and the quality of securities being offered in
the exchange." '38 These items, including the adequacy of the
tender offer plus the reputation of the raider, were examined by
the court as a whole in determining the reasonableness of the
board's actions. Essentially, the court examined whether the board
was dealing with a greenmail situation and if it dealt with the
threat properly.
If a company makes a legitimate tender offer, according to
Unocal it will be required to show that its offer is "adequate. 1 39
Mesa's offer failed this test as the court found it inadequate due
to its coercive two-tiered nature. Restricting two-tiered offers has
been suggested as a remedy to eliminate a raider's ability to "co-
erce" the shareholders into tendering their shares. 4 ° Such offers
136. Id.
137. The Unocal court relied on a total of six factors collectively and did not isolate
the reputation of the raider or the adequacy of the tender offer as determinative. Unocal,
493 A.2d at 955.
138. Id. "Constituencies" refers to "creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps
even the community generally . Id.
139. See id. at 956.
140. See Dennis, supra note 63, at 281-83.
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cause shareholders to tender for fear of being forced to accept the
back-end, lower-valued compensation without due consideration
for the price of the compensation offered in the front-end or for
the adequacy of the tender offer in general. However, the Dela-
ware court did not ban outright two-tiered offers; rather, the court
considered the nature of the tender offer in conjunction with cer-
tain elements in determining whether the Unocal board of direc-
tors' actions were reasonable with respect to the threat posed.
Consequently, if a tender offer is not two-tiered, the court might
not be willing to accept such drastic defensive measures as a $6.1
billion discriminatory self-tender offer.
Finally, the court granted Unocal's board of directors more def-
erence due to the fact that it had a majority of independent direc-
tors.141 The rationale supporting the court's deference is that if the
directors are not active in management, their decisions will not be
affected by the desire to further perpetuate their control in
management.
In conclusion, in reviewing a board's defensive action to a take-
over/greenmail threat, the Supreme Court of Delaware will con-
sider the following: the reputation of the raider, the nature and
timing of the tender offer (including the quality of the compensa-
tion being offered in the exchange), questions of illegality, the im-
pact on contituencies, the risk of non-consumation and whether
the board consists mainly of independent directors. In light of the
above elements, the court will then decide whether the directors'
defensive measure was reasonable with respect to the threat posed
and whether the board acted in good faith.
The third criticism of Unocal is that it reinforces management
entrenchment. 42 Although Unocal offers directors the freedom to
thwart a greenmail threat, its solution simply results in a more
equitable distribution of corporate wealth and does not solve the
fundamental underlying problem of management entrenchment.
The court's solution is only a temporary measure which alters the
effect of greenmail, but certainly not its cause. As a result, this
Comment proposes an alternative to solving the greenmail prob-
lem which might effectively attend to all the defensive tactics by
attacking management entrenchment.
141. Delaware is inclined to find that the board acted in good faith if the board is
comprised mostly of independent directors. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815 (Del.
1984); Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d 693, 695 (Del. Ch. 1971).
142. This criticism stems from the fact that the directors will be able to perpetuate
their control by either making a self-tender offer or by making the greenmail payment.
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IV. AN ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
Substantial controversy has raged over the validity of various
defensive tactics employed by target corporations. Most literature
calls for the permission or prohibition of a particular defensive
measure,14 3 rather than the questioning of the source of authority
to employ defensive tactics in general. This section proposes a so-
lution to the takeover defense problems by focusing on the ability
of target corporations to employ such defensive mechanisms. In-
stead of simply concluding that certain defenses such as greenmail
are valid, this proposal will concentrate on the directors' motives.
On the one hand, some commentators argue that the business
judgment rule should apply in the context of tender offers.144 On
the other hand, some argue that the directors of a target company
should maintain complete passivity, thereby eliminating the need
for the business judgment rule in cases of tender offers. 145 Both of
these extreme positions rely on flawed assumptions.
The first argument, which calls for strict adherence to the busi-
ness judgment rule, is advocated by noted commentator Martin
Lipton. Lipton argues that hostile tender offers are detrimental to
the economy because they jeopardize long term planning, en-
courage speculation and divert resources away from productive in-
vestment.146 This argument is premised on the fact that directors
must consider a number of variables when deciding to defend a
takeover1 47 and on the conclusion that directors are best suited to
make these decisions. Lipton notes that "[w]hile as far as is
known no director has ever been held liable for the rejection of a
takeover bid, almost every successful takeover defense results in
shareholder lawsuits against the directors of the target. 1 48 This
statement appears to undermine Lipton's argument in that if suc-
cessful takeover defenses lead to shareholder lawsuits against the
directors, there appears to be a general impression among share-
holders that their interests have not been the motivation underly-
ing the directors' actions. This, combined with the fact that direc-
tors who fight takeovers are not found liable for their actions,
143. See, e.g., Dennis, supra note 63; Macey & McChesney, supra note 16; Note,
supra note i; Comment, supra note 8.
144. See, e.g., Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom; An Update After
One Year, 36 Bus. LAW. 1017 (1981); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom:
A Response to Professors Easterbook and Fischel, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1231 (1980); Lip-
ton, supra note 70.
145. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 3.
146. Lipton, supra note 70, at 104, 110, 113-14.
147. An example of some of the variables the directors must consider were listed in
Unocal. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying. text.
148. Lipton, supra note 70, at 101.
1987]
23
Balluff: Greenmail: From Backrooms to Boardrooms to Courtrooms
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1986
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
indicates that the business judgment rule is too protective since it
virtually precludes shareholders from enforcing their rights
against directors. To that extent, the business judgment rule en-
ables the directors to act in their own self interest.
Additionally, Lipton's argument is flawed because it contends
that the decision to defend against a takeover is no different from
decisions concerning capital expenditures, new product introduc-
tions or adoption of new processes.' 49 The comparison is erroneous
in that the latter types of decisions do not present the immediate
threat to the security of the directors' positions as does a take-
over. 150 This, combined with Lipton's reference to the ease with
which directors can satisfy the good faith/reasonable basis re-
quirements of the business judgment rule,' 5' suggests that Lipton
is somewhat altruistic in his disregard for the "omnipresent spec-
ter" 152 that the directors may act in their own self interest without
regard to the corporation or the shareholders. Lipton's emphasis
on the many variables that the target directors must consider
when faced with a takeover are certainly justified, but is his argu-
ment for continued carte blanche warranted?
Easterbrook and Fischel, two well-noted professors, think not.'
53
They suggest total passivity on behalf of target directors, allowing
shareholders to make the decision. This extreme position is also
premised on some weak assumptions. Although they offer a good
argument that tender offers are beneficial, it is also true that some
tender offers are simply inadequate and should be rejected. 5 In
fact, in some cases, the target directors may be forced by their
fiduciary duty to thwart the takeover. 55 In that event, the ex-
treme change in law suggested by Easterbrook and Fischel would
contradict the directors' obligations.5 6
149. Id. at 120.
150. A dominant motive for waging a takeover battle is the expected increase in the
target's profits by changing management. Therefore, managers and directors naturally feel
threatened by a takeover to such an extent that they will attempt to thwart the takeover to
protect their positions. See generaly McIntyre, supra note 18.
151. Lipton, supra note 70, at 105.
152. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
153. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 33.
154. A target company's rejection of a takeover on any one of the following grounds
is reasonable: inadequate price, wrong time to sell, illegality, adverse impact on constituen-
cies other than shareholders, risk of nonconsummation, failure to provide equally for all
shareholders and doubt as to quality of the raider's securities in an exchange offer. Lipton,
supra note 70, at 122-23.
155. The board of directors owes the shareholders a fiduciary duty to act in the
shareholders' best interests. If a tender offer is truly inadequate, then the directors should
defend against the takeover, preferably by soliciting a higher bid from another raider.
Bebehuck, supra note 41, at 1030.
156. Lipton argues for a scenerio that could immunize directors from breaching their
fiduciary duty, whereas Easterbrook and Fischel argue for a situation that could prevent
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One must also question the ability and feasibility of the share-
holders to make an informed decision to accept or reject a tender
offer. The assertion that shareholders should make the decision to
defend tends to ignore many factors normally considered by target
directors in a takeover situation.15 As a result, defensive tactics
are best dealt with on a case-by-case basis as opposed a to legisla-
tive basis. Also, requiring target directors to maintain a passive
role would feed the consuming fire of the coercive two-tiered
offer. 1 58
These two extreme positions not only emphasize the controversy
that exists regarding the application of the business judgment rule
to defend a takeover, but also represent the dichotomy in the po-
tential solutions to the problem. This section proposes a solution
which is a hybrid of these two schools of thought.
The negative impact of greenmail on shareholders is an example
of some of the problems existing in corporate takeover battles. 1 1
Despite this, some take the even more extreme position that
greenmail is not necessarily bad.160 This is because there exist so
many variables in each greenmail situation that a generalization
becomes inaccurate. This point is even more valid with respect to
other defensive tactics which have not received such strong nega-
tive commentary as greenmail.16" As a result of this dichotomy of
approaches, a case-by-case analysis by an administrative tribunal
ultimately may be the most effective method of determining
whether the directors have acted in a purely self motivated man-
ner or whether shareholder interests supported their actions. Such
a proposal is not a complete abandonment of the business judg-
ment rule, but rather is a more tailored application of the rule. 62
Depending on the circumstances, an administrative tribunal could
look beyond the rule to ascertain whether the interests of the
shareholders were truly served. It is the interests of the sharehold-
ers which would be the ultimate test.
Creating a very limited exception to the business judgment rule,
as this Comment suggests, would involve incurring all the negative
ramifications previously discussed. To briefly reiterate, claiming
directors from fulfilling their duty. The solution appears to lie somewhere between these
extreme positions.
157. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
158. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956.
159. See supra notes 48-74 and accompanying text.
160. See Macey & McChesney, supra note 16.
161. For example, poison pills have received mixed reviews although they have been
permitted by the courts. See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059 (Del. Ch.
1985).
162. For a discussion of the business judgment rule, see supra text accompanying
notes 24-47.
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that they simply are not equipped to make business decisions, the
courts refuse to second-guess a board of directors. If the directors
were subject to liability for their business decisions, they would
effectively be inhibited from holding a position on a board of di-
rectors and, for those individuals who were brave enough to hold
such a position, would be prevented from making appropriate de-
cisions. This proposal does not call for a complete repeal of the
business judgment rule. Rather, it calls for a closer review of busi-
ness decisions limited to takeovers and tender offers and only in
specific instances. Arguably, even in "specific instances," existing
courts would not be qualified to evaluate the directors' deci-
sions. 163 As a result, this Comment proposes to create an adminis-
trative tribunal that would be qualified to look more closely at the
decisions of directors. The following section proposes the struc-
ture, nature and jurisdiction necessary for a tribunal to succeed as
a remedy to the problems existing in corporate takeover battles.6 "
A. The Organizational Structure
A tribunal established to deal with takeover and tender offer
problems necessarily affects the subject matter governed by the
SEC and should, therefore, be affiliated with the SEC. 65 The tri-
bunal would be included within the SEC budget allocation from
Congress, but would be a completely separate entity. This affilia-
tion is tenuous to isolate any bias the SEC may have. The SEC
would not have control over screening the cases brought before the
tribunal which would be those normally coming before the courts.
Therefore, the types and number of cases heard on the subject
would not be altered.
So that the role of the SEC in dealing with court cases under its
realm of power is not altered, the legislation creating the tribunal
would provide the SEC with the right of intervention. This would
enable the SEC both to bring cases and to be a party to cases,
thereby maintaining the status quo.16 Such a structure would not
affect the power that the SEC presently has, but would simply
163. "[C]ourts are ill equipped and infrequently called on to evaluate what are and
must be essentially business judgments." Auerbach v. Bennet, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 630, 393
N.E.2d 994, 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926 (1979).
164. This proposal simply suggests a general overview of the make-up of a tribunal.
It does not purport to establish the complex details inherent in creating a new tribunal.
Such a task is perhaps best left to another law review article.
165. The SEC has regulatory power to enforce the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
This Act stipulates regulations for tender offers and takeovers.
166. That is, the SEC would be able to bring an action for violation of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 in the tribunal instead of in the courts when a tender offer or take-
over is involved.
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change the setting in which cases under SEC jurisdiction would be
brought.
To maintain the severability of the SEC from the tribunal, the
SEC would not be the body to which appeals are made. The right
of appeal would be maintained, but appeals would be made to the
existing court system. Again, this would prevent any bias that the
SEC may have from affecting the cases brought before the
tribunal.
In summation, the tribunal would be affiliated with the SEC
but only to the extent that the two bodies would be funded under
the same congressional budget allocation. This would result in
maintaining the types and number of cases now brought before
the judiciary, as well as preventing any bias of the SEC from af-
fecting the outcome of these cases.
What is more likely to affect the outcome of the cases is the
nature of such a tribunal. Under this proposal, it would be organ-
ized in a fashion that would ultimately render it a "qualified"
court.
B. The Nature of the Tribunal
The qualifications of the adjudicators would include the exper-
tise necessary to closely evaluate the business decisions of direc-
tors. Ultimately, the panel members would have backgrounds in
economics, accounting, tax, finance and law. These qualifications
would give the tribunal the foundation on which to develop and
refine its skills until, ultimately, it would have the requisite back-
ground to closely scrutinize the decisions of directors when
necessary.1 67
The tribunal would hear cases just as the present courts do, ap-
plying existing law. However, there would be a different level of
scrutiny afforded the business decisions of directors faced with a
takeover. The tribunal would be in a position to give the directors'
decisions a stricter review, depending on the nature of the tender
offer and other considerations."0 8 For example, if the tender offer
was a coercive two-tiered offer, 6 9 then the tribunal would afford
the directors more deference in defending the takeover than if the
tender offer was a one step proposal which offered a share price
significantly above the market trading price. The flexible nature of
the tribunal would permit it to adhere to the business judgment
167. An impetus to create tribunals in other fields of law, as well as this one, is the
expertise that tribunals and specialized courts gain when continuously faced with the same
subject matter.
168. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
169. See, e.g., id. at 956.
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rule when it determined that the interests of the shareholders were
served and to ignore the rule when it established that the directors
were not acting in the best interests of the shareholders.
Some have argued that relying on the business judgment rule
best serves shareholders' interests.'7 0 However, if the rule is relied
on to its present extent, the question of whose interests were
served will never be addressed. Again, as long as there is no show-
ing of bad faith or self-dealing, the directors' actions will be pro-
tected.17 1 By submitting the question to a qualified tribunal, the
true question could be addressed and not simply avoided as is the
present practice.'72 Eventually, the tribunal would develop an ex-
pertise in evaluating corporate takeover business decisions and
thereby would promote justice by ensuring that shareholders' in-
terests are the ultimate concern.
During its initial development, the tribunal would not have the
expertise that it would gain over time. This cost to the business
community or society, if any, would be minimal compared to the
long term benefits. The higher level of justice resulting from a
more detailed scrutiny on a case-by-case basis would result in so-
lutions which would be substantially more likely to preserve the
best interests of shareholders. Additionally, the cost of the short
term deficiencies of the tribunal must be considered in light of the
cost of the present legal remedy.'17 The initial cost of the tribunal
would be comparable to the cost of management entrenchment
presently borne by the shareholders. As a result, the initial cost of
the proposed tribunal would be outweighed by the long term gain.
The final, and perhaps the most important consideration in cre-
ating a tribunal, is the jurisdiction afforded such a tribunal. This
is the topic of the following section.
C. Jurisdiction of the Tribunal
To ensure the success of the proposed tribunal, it must have
exclusive jurisdiction over the tender offer/takeover subject matter
encompassed by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. If exclusive
jurisdiction were not allowed, the inconsistencies between adjudi-
cating bodies would create more problems than would be solved.
However, exclusive jurisdiction would create problems where a
170. See generally Macey & McChesney, supra note 16.
171. See generally notes 24-47 and accompanying text.
172. "[T]he business judgment rule does not express the measure by which a court
determines whether management has discharged its duty of care; rather, its application
reflects a conclusion that the management action in question will not be reviewed at all."
Gilson, supra note 28, at 822.
173. The present costs are the agency costs of management entrenchment which
causes suboptimal management efficiency. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
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case concerned a variety of issues. To address this problem, the
legislation creating the tribunal would provide that the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction would apply.1"4 As a result, where a case
arises in the traditional courts, the presiding judge would be re-
quired to determine if the administrative tribunal had primary ju-
risdiction and, if it did, the case would be deferred to the tribunal.
To ensure that the state courts also followed this doctrine, the leg-
islation creating the tribunal would also state that the federal gov-
ernment preempted the field.'15 Only with exclusive federal
jurisidiction could the tribunal develop the standards and expertise
necessary to justify piercing the protection of the business judg-
ment rule. 176
There would be a right of appeal allowed into the existing judi-
cial system. However, the standard of review on appeal would be
strictly applied.1 7 This would result in the appellate court being
able to reverse the tribunal's decision only in limited circum-
stances. This would preserve the jurisdiction of the tribunal by
creating a system that would effectively compel litigants to turn
initially to this tribunal for a remedy. The appropriate standard of
review would assure the tribunal that its decisions would not be
easily overturned and would assist the tribunal in developing and
refining its expertise.
If appellate courts were always given the power of de novo re-
view, the very purpose of creating a tribunal with specific exper-
tise would be meaningless. To do so would effectively force the
appellate court to make decisions that it has continually asserted
it is not qualified to make. Additionally, the fear of the ramifica-
tions of completely eliminating the business judgment rule could
be fully realized.178 Therefore, it is necessary to give the tribunal a
significant amount of deference.
The tribunal thus would be implementing exclusive federal ju-
risdiction in regard to tender offer/takeover issues under the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934. To preserve this jurisdiction, a
strict review process would be implemented. The tribunal's exclu-
sive jurisdiction would give it the opportunity to gain expertise to
delve into the decisions of directors in protecting the best interests
174. Primary jurisdiction is applicable to many administrative tribunals.
175. Explicit preemption would prevent the state courts from asserting jurisdiction in
this particular field.
176. If the tribunal had to function along with other courts hearing the same mat-
ters, the inconsistencies which would arise would defeat the tribunal's purpose to create a
consistent and reliable standard of law in the field of tender offers.
177. Generally, standards of review range from abuse of discretion to de novo
review.
178. See generally supra notes 24-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
business judgement rule.
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of shareholders.
The structure, nature and jurisdiction of the proposed tribunal
are designed to create a setting in which the business community
and the law can be assured that the interests of the shareholders
are protected. As mentioned, these characteristics would afford
the tribunal the ability to look beyond the business judgment rule
in evaluating the decisions of directors, but only on a very selec-
tive basis, depending on the particular circumstances. Eventually,
the decisions of the tribunal, combined with the directors' limited
fear of incurring liability for acting in their self interest, would
result in a convergance of the interests of shareholders and direc-
tors. More specifically, directors would be compelled to permit a
takeover if it were in the best interests of the shareholders. Given
that directors would not want a takeover to occur, they would try
to make their corporation an unattractive target by maximizing
efficiency so that it would not be the type of undervalued company
prone to a takeover. The resulting increased profits would benefit
both the shareholders and society.
CONCLUSION
A board of directors' decision to defend a takeover is protected
by the business judgment rule. The directors need only show that
they acted in good faith and upon reasonable investigation. This
burden is so easily satisfied that directors can consequently act in
their own self-interests rather than in the shareholders' best inter-
ests. This problem is accentuated in the context of a takeover
where the interests of the directors to secure their positions does
not coincide with the shareholders' interests in maximizing the
rate of return on their investment.
The tactic of greenmail employed in this discussion illustrates
the negative effect that blanket director protection has on corpora-
tions and shareholders in the context of a takeover." It also
shows the need for the law to address defensive tactics.
Although there have been legislative attempts to prohibit green-
mail, they have been unsuccessful up to the present time.180 This
is likely a reflection of the difficulty in making generalizations
about greenmail and even more so with regard to other defensive
tactics. The underlying reason for the lack of success in control-
ling greenmail is that since so many different considerations exist
in each case, banning the tactic outright is difficult. 181 Also, the
179. See generally supra notes 48-74 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 13.
181. See supra notes 137-38 and acompanying text.
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directors may be faced with a takeover that is truly not in the best
interests of a corporation so that employing defensive tactics
would be warranted.182 As a result, a case-by-case analysis is the
optimal method of deciding whether the directors have acted in
the best interests of the corporation and shareholders.
Under present law, the courts are forced to grant directors
great deference in defending a takeover and consequently refuse
to determine if the defense was in the best interests of the share-
holders. On the other hand, the business judgment rule is neces-
sary to ensure that directors can make proper business decisions
without fear of liability. As a result, this Comment proposes that
a qualified administrative tribunal be created. Such a tribunal
would gain expertise over time so that it could justly scrutinize the
decisions of directors in the context of a takeover, but only where
it appears that the directors did not act in the interests of the
corporation or shareholders. Ultimately, such a system would
force directors to defend a takeover only where they could show
that they are acting in the best interests of the corporation and
the shareholders.
Karien L. Balluff
182. See supra note 154.
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